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Abstract
We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the
outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The rst approach is static
where a state-contingent participation constraint denes an implicit mapping from re-
jected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary
implementation, and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not volun-
tarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if
the outcome at any stage is vetoed by one of the agents. We call this stationary imple-
mentation, and show that if players discount the future in any way, then the constrained
Walrasian correspondence is stationarily implementable.

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1 Introduction
Implementation theory has been successful in characterizing the objectives that a society
can implement when accounting for the incentives that individuals have to take advantage of
their information. Nevertheless, the theory is open to criticism for the sometimes implausible
mechanisms (i.e., game forms) that it relies on to show which objectives may be achieved. In
this paper we focus on remedying a specic, but critical, weakness of implementation theory:
its use of implausible outcomes o the equilibrium path to enforce equilibrium behavior
and/or to \break" undesirable equilibria (i.e., assure that undesired strategy combinations
are not equilibria). The implausibility stems from the assumption that the outcome function
is fully enforceable
1
, which is not the case in many applications.
One source of diculty in enforcement relates to commitment. If, for example, a mecha-
nism is constructed to assist bargainers in reaching mutually improving agreements, then it
is problematic to assume that highly inecient outcomes will be allowed to stand. This is
potentially a problem both on and o the equilibrium path, as o-equilibrium path consid-
erations have implications for equilibrium behavior.
A second source of diculty with enforcement relates to property rights that are exogenous
to a mechanism and impose state-contingent constraints on a social choice rule. In many
settings individuals have inalienable rights that guarantee them some outcomes in some
states of the world. Many economic models treat these rights as exogenous, and only impose
them as participation constraints or individual rationality constraints. Here, we stress the
importance of considering these constraints out of equilibrium as well as in equilibrium.
A third source of diculty with enforcement is related to dynamic contexts. Most im-
plementation problems that have been studied are static. After the mechanism has reached
an outcome, the world ends. In fact, most of these are more realistically viewed as being a
single period of a multiperiod allocation problem. Thus, it makes sense to model explicitly
the dynamics that can occur after the mechanism has tentatively reached an outcome. Is
there renegotiation? Is the mechanism replayed? Is there time discounting between periods?
1
See Hurwicz (1994) for a general discussion of issues related to enforceability in mechanism design.
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The framework laid out is designed to address these problems with enforcement, and
variations on them, in a unied way, and includes the standard implementation problem as a
special case. While this admits a number of applications, the implications of the characteri-
zation theorems depend on the specics of the setting. We then specialize to an application
of the reasoning to a study of dynamic implementation in stationary equilibria, where specic
implications can be understood.
1.1 Relation to the Literature
There has been a urry of recent research into the general question of realistic restrictions on
mechanisms.
2
There are several papers that address either the issue of individual rationality,
or renegotiation. Most closely related to this paper are three papers that deal with impos-
ing individual rationality or allowing for renegotiation both in and out of equilibrium.
3
Ma,
Moore and Turnbull (1988) were the rst to point out the importance of imposing an individ-
ual rationality constraint both in and out of equilibrium. They examined a principal-agent
model where the usual individual rationality constraint (imposed only on the equilibrium
path) was replaced by an \opt-out," where each player had the ability to decline the outcome
of the mechanism and accept a status-quo outcome instead. Maskin and Moore (1998) ex-
amined a more general implementation problem, and changed the opting out to a possibility
of renegotiation. They considered implementation where any outcome of a mechanism that
suggests a Pareto dominated allocation is replaced by a Pareto ecient allocation according
to an exogenous renegotiation function.
4
In Jackson and Palfrey (1998), in the context of a
2
See Jackson (1997) for an overview and references.
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A more distantly related (but similarly motivated) problem in implementation theory is \credibility", or
the ability of the planner to commit to o-equilibrium-path outcomes that are known to be undesirable, in
order to implement desirable outcomes on the equilibrium path. Chakravorti, Corchon, and Wilkie (1992)
investigate this, and Baliga, Corchon, and Sjostrom (1995) and Baliga and Sjostrom (1995) go further, by
including the planner as a player in the mechanism.
4
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992) took a dierent approach to incorporating the possibility of renegotiation
into implementation. They examined \renegotiation-proof" implementation in a pairwise bargaining setting
where the equilibrium was required to be immune to dierent sorts of renegotiation, and showed that the
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dynamic bargaining and matching model, we endogenized the alternative coming from the
\opt-out." We considered implementation when players have the ability to opt out of the
outcome suggested by the mechanism and be rematched with a new bargaining partner. We
showed that although such an endogenous individual rationality constraint is compatible with
eciency within individual matches, it could be incompatible with eciency from society's
point of view accounting for the overall evolution of a market.
Here, we begin by unifying these approaches. They all have the common feature of viewing
a mechanism as an intermediate institution that suggests outcomes that may subsequently
be altered. This may be captured in a general form of implementation where an outcome
of a mechanism is converted by a general state-contingent allocation rule { which we call a
reversion function. The characterization of implementable rules given such reversion func-
tions follows a close parallel to the characterization of Nash implementable rules. Next, we
examine voluntary implementation where the reversion function is in the form of an individ-
ual rationality constraint, in the spirit of Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988), but taken to the
general implementation problem. We show that the implications of such constraints may be
derived in a variety of settings from voting to exchange. Finally, in the spirit of Jackson and
Palfrey (1998), we examine a model where players may force the game form to be replayed,
thereby endogenizing the reversion function (in this case, the alternative that individuals
may be opting for). This ts well with the structure of many markets, where the mechanism
represents the protocol or rules by which agents negotiate and trades are not nalized until
all parties reach agreement. We show that without discounting, the set of implementable cor-
respondences is severely limited, while with discounting much more positive results may be
obtained, and for instance, the constrained Walrasian correspondence may be implemented.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the general frame-
work and explains how the standard implementation model is being extended. We establish
necessary and sucient conditions for voluntary implementation. The conditions are the
natural extensions of monotonicity and no veto power, modied to incorporate the voluntary
possibilities for implementation depend on the way in which renegotiation is modeled.
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constraints. Section 3 presents examples which illustrate the eect of voluntary constraints
on the set of implementable social choice correspondences. That section also shows how
individual rationality constraints, renegotiation, and blocking coalitions all fall within the
bounds of this framework. Section 4 looks at implementation when the voluntary constraint
is modeled as a replay of the mechanism.
2 Denitions
There is a nite set of individuals or agents, I = f1; : : : ; ng, a known set of feasible outcomes,
denoted A, and a set of states S, with individual states denoted by s.
The preferences of individuals may be state dependent, and so each state has a corre-
sponding prole of preference relations, R(s) = (R
1
(s); : : :R
n
(s)), where R
i
(s) is a weak
preference ordering over A. We write aR
i
(s)b if i weakly prefers a to b, and aP
i
(s)b if the
preference is strict.
A social choice correspondence is a (possibly multi-valued) mapping F : S ) A. A single-
valued social choice correspondence is called a social choice function, and is denoted in the
lower case, f . The set of all social choice correspondences is denoted by F .
A mechanism, (M; g), consists of a message space, M = M
1
  M
n
that is a Cartesian
product of n individual message spaces, one for each agent, and an outcome function, g :
M ! A.
2.1 Voluntary Implementation and h-Nash implementability
The idea behind voluntary implementation is similar to the notion of an individual rationality
constraint or a participation constraint. Individuals are permitted to veto some subset of the
feasible set, which may vary across states and individuals. This idea can be illustrated in the
simple example of a pure exchange economy with xed initial endowments, ! = (!
1
; : : : ; !
n
).
If x denotes some reallocation of !, then this reallocation is individually rational at s if and
only if x
i
R
i
(s)!
i
for all i. Suppose the mechanism is (M; g), the players report m at s, and
the reallocation specied by the outcome function is g(m). If !
i
P
i
(s)g
i
(m) for some i, and
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we wish the mechanism to reect voluntary trade, then we should allow this individual to
veto the outcome g
i
(m): The issue, of course, is how to specify the consequences of this veto.
The simplest way to model voluntary implementation is to explicitly specify what happens
if an individual vetoes an outcome. To do this involves specifying a function that maps states
into allocations.
A reversion function, h : S ! A, is a mapping that indicates what the outcome is in the
case of a veto by some individual. A reversion function h induces a mapping H : A S F ,
by
H(a; s; h) = a if a R
i
(s) h(s) for all i
= h(s) otherwise:
An action prole m is an h-Nash equilibrium of (M; g) at s if
H(g(m); s; h) R
i
(s) H(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s; h) for all i
b
m
i
2M
i
A social choice correspondence F is h-Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism,
(M; g) such that, for all s :
(i) For each a 2 F (s) there exists an h-Nash equilibrium, m 2M , such thatH(g(m); s; h) =
a
(ii) If m 2M is an h-Nash equilibrium at s, then H(g(m); s; h)2 F (s).
2.2 Necessary condition for h-Nash implementation
It is well-known that monotonicity of the social choice correspondence is a necessary condition
for Nash implementation. (See Maskin (1998))
F is monotonic if, for all s; s
0
2 S and a 2 F (s) such that a =2 F (s
0
); there exists b 2 A
and i 2 I such that a R
i
(s) b and b P
i
(s
0
) a.
The intuition behind this condition is that if a 2 F (s) but a =2 F (s), then implementability
of F implies the existence of a mechanism where a is a Nash equilibrium outcome at s, but
not a Nash equilibrium outcome at s
0
: Thus, considering the equilibrium strategies leading
5
to a at s, there must exist an agent i that has a deviation (resulting in b), which must be
preferred by i at s
0
, but not at s.
This condition generalizes in a straightforward way to h,implementation. We call this
condition reversion-monotonicity.
A social choice correspondence, F , is reversion-monotonic relative to h if, for all s 2 S
and for all a 2 F (s); there exists z 2 A such that:
1. H(z; s; h) = a, and
2. For all s
0
2 S such that H(z; s
0
; h) =2 F (s
0
); there exists y 2 A and i 2 I such that
H(z; s; h) R
i
(s) H(y; s; h) and H(y; s
0
; h) P
i
(s
0
) H(z; s
0
; h).
The necessity of this condition follows the same reasoning as the necessity of monotonicity
for Nash implementation. There are two dierences however. The rst is noted in item 1
above, where it is recognized that a may not be coming directly from the mechanism, but
instead from the reversion function. The second dierence is in item 2, where it is not just
the lower contour set of a that matters, but also the (state-dependent) reversion function,
since this function determines what outcomes will be vetoed in each state and the resulting
reversion point following a veto.
2.3 Generalized Reversion Functions
In fact, this necessary condition can be stated in a more general form, which will prove
useful in the dynamic context as well. The approach outlined above with a reversion function
presumes that any single agent can veto an outcome and then the alternative that replaces it
is independent of the starting alternative. Instead, we can consider the situation where any
suggested alternative a is converted in a state dependent way via some mapping G.
Consider any mapping G : A  S ! A. The H dened above for a given h is one such
function.
We say that m is an G-Nash equilibrium of (M; g) at s if
G(g(m); s) R
i
(s) G(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s) for all i ;
b
m
i
2M
i
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A social choice correspondence F is G-Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism,
(M; g) such that, for all s :
(i) For each a 2 F (s) there exists an G-Nash equilibrium, m 2M; such thatG(g(m); s) = a
(ii) If m 2M is a G-Nash equilibrium at s, then G(g(m); s) 2 F (s).
A social choice correspondence, F , is G-monotonic if, for all s 2 S and for all a 2 F (s);
there exists z 2 A such that:
1. G(z; s) = a
2. For all s
0
2 S such that G(z; s
0
) =2 F (s
0
); there exists y 2 A and i 2 I such that
G(z; s) R
i
(s) G(y; s) and G(y; s
0
) P
i
(s
0
) G(z; s
0
).
The following theorem follows directly from the logic of Maskin's theorem (1998).
Theorem 1 If F is G-Nash implementable, then F is G-monotonic.
Proof: Consider a state, s, and an outcome, a 2 F (s). Let (M; g) G-implement F in Nash
equilibrium, and let m be a Nash equilibrium at s which produces a as the outcome. That is,
G(g(m); s) = a. Next suppose that G(g(m); s
0
) =2 F (s
0
) for some other state s
0
. Let z = g(m).
Since m is a G-Nash equilibrium at s, it must be that G(g(m); s)R
i
(s)G(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s) for all
i,
b
m
i
: But since F is G-Nash implementable and G(z; s
0
) =2 F (s
0
); we know thatm is not a G-
Nash equilibrium at s
0
. So, there exists i and
b
m
i
) such that G(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s
0
)P
i
(s
0
)(g(m); s
0
).
Let y = g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
), to satisfy the denition of G-monotonicity.
Similarly, sucient conditions for Nash implementation have analogs for G-Nash impl-
mentation.
With Nash implementation, it is well-known that if there are at least 3 players, monotonic
social choice correspondences are Nash implementable if they satisfy No Veto Power. No veto
power states that if all players except possibly one agree on a best outcome in some state,
then that outcome must be in the social choice correspondence at that state. A similar result
follows here for G-Nash implementation, using an appropriately modied version of NVP.
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A social choice correspondence F satises G-No Veto Power (G-NVP) if, for all i 2 I , for
all j 6= i, z 2 A, and s 2 S, then G(z; s) 2 F (s) whenever G(z; s)R
j
(s)G(y; s) for all y 2 A.
Theorem 2 If n  3 and F is G-monotonic and satisesG,NV P; then F is G-implementable.
Again, the proof is an easy extension of proofs of Nash implementability, and is provided
in an appendix.
3 Applications
3.1 Implementation with Individual Rationality Constraints
One of the most natural applications of h-implementation is to problems in which there
is a xed status quo outcome that any agent can revert to. For example, in the case of
exchange economies, it is often natural to assume that each individual can protect their initial
endowment. Surprisingly, applications of implementation theory to exchange environments
generally ignore these constraints. This is not to claim that implementation theory has not
investigated whether certain individually rational social choice functions are implementable.
That is a much dierent issue. The issue is that individual rationality constraints must be
respected for the entire outcome function, rather than just at the equilibrium outcome. Why?
If the individual messages happen to produce an outcome that violates individual rationality
constraints, then a violated agent can simply veto the outcome. We are requiring that the
mechanism be voluntary: no agent can be forced to accept an outcome. This views the
mechanism as the protocol for communication and negotiation between agents, after which
all of their signatures are required before a suggested outcome becomes nal.
5
As we will see below, the constraint that outcomes be acceptable to all agents can either
restrict or even expand the set of allocation rules that are implementable. The intuition for
why the set of implementable social choice functions can be restricted by such constraints is
obvious. The intuition for why the set of implementable social choice functions can expand
5
Thus, this viewpoint takes a mechanism as the means by which binding contracts are formed, rather than
viewing the mechanism as a binding contract itself.
8
is more subtle, and has to do with the fact that these constraints implicitly provide state-
contingent threat points that can aect equilibrium behavior.
6
The simplest reversion function is simply a xed status quo outcome, w, which results if
any individual vetoes g(m). That is, h(s) = w for all s and
H(a; s; h) = a if aR
i
(s)w for all i
= w if wP
i
(s)a for some i:
We call h-implementation with this kind of reversion function IR-implementation, and we
refer to h-reversion monotonicity with this kind of reversion function as IR-monotonicity.
The following examples illustrate how IR-monotonicity can dier from monotonicity. The
rst example illustrates this surprising phenomenon that a social choice correspondence may
satisfy IR-monotonicity, but fail to be monotonic.
Example 1 (Voting)
Let A = fw; x; y; zg, I = f1; 2; 3g, and S = fs; s
0
g. The status quo outcome is w
(regardless of the state). Preferences are described below, where higher outcomes in the
table are preferred to lower outcomes.
s s
0
1 2 3 1 2 3
x y z x y z
z z x z z x
y x w y x y
w w y w w w
Let F (s) = fx; zg and F (s
0
) = fxg. F is not monotonic, since z 2 F (s), z =2 F (s
0
), but the
only preference reversal between s and s
0
involves agent 3's preferences changing between out-
comes y and w. However, F satises IR-monotonicity. To see this, note that H(y; s
0
; h) = y,
6
The fact that allowing agents to opt-out can ease implementation has been previously noted in a moral
hazard setting by Arya, Glover, and Hughes (1997).
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but H(y; s; h) = w. Thus, for player 2 it is the case that H(z; s; h)R
2
(s)H(y; s; h) and
H(y; s
0
; h)P
2
(s
0
)H(z; s
0
; h), since these two relations reduce to zR
2
(s)w and yP
2
(s
0
)z; respec-
tively.
To understand this phenomenon, note that the revision function introduces a form of
sequential rationality to the Nash implementation problem.
The same phenomenon can be seen in an exchange economy.
Example 2 (An exchange economy)
Consider a two-person two-good exchange economy, with initial endowment point w =
((1; 5); (5; 1)). There are two states, which determine two possible preference proles. In
state s, both players have preferences represented by symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tions U(x
i1
; x
i2
) = x
i1
x
i2
. In state s
0
individuals have Leontief preferences represented by
U(x
i1
; x
i2
) = minfx
i1
; x
i2
g. This is shown in gure 1.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Consider the following selection from the Pareto correspondence:
7
f(s) = x
CD
= ((3; 3); (3; 3))
f(s
0
) = x
L
= ((2; 2); (4; 4))
The social choice function f is not monotonic. To see this, note that monotonicity requires
that if x 2 f(s) and x =2 f(s
0
), then there exists i and y such that yP
i
(s
0
)x and xR
i
(s)y. In
this case, given the Leontief preferences at s
0
, if yP
i
(s
0
)x
CD
then y
i
 (3; 3) and y
i
6= (3; 3).
But this implies that yP
i
(s)x
CD
given the Cobb-Douglass preferences at s. However, while f
is not monotonic, it is in fact IR-monotonic. The key is that the lower contour sets relative
to w dier between states s and s
0
. To see how the problem above with monotonicity is
7
A similar example appears in Moore and Repullo (1988), to illustrate how non-monotonic social choice
functions can be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium.
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overcome, note that IR-monotonicity requires that if x 2 f(s) then there exists z such that
x = H(z; s; h) (where h reverts to the endowment w) and if H(z; s; h) =2 f(s
0
) then there
exists y and i such that H(z; s; h) R
i
(s) H(y; s; h) and H(y; s
0
; h) P
i
(s
0
) H(z; s
0
; h). Here,
let z = x
CD
, y = x
L
and i = 2. Then H(y; s; h) = w as agent 1 vetoes x
L
in state s while
H(y; s
0
; h) = x
L
. So the condition is satised as we have x
CD
R
i
(s)w and x
L
P
i
(s
0
)x
CD
.
Moreover, f is IR-implementable via the trivial mechanism where player 2 simply chooses
between x
CD
and x
L
. In state s, x
CD
is individually rational, but x
L
is not individually
rational for player 1, so this choice reduces to a choice between x
CD
and w. Since player 2
prefers x
CD
to w, his optimal choice is x
CD
. In state s
0
, both x
CD
and x
L
are individually
rational for both players. Since player 2 prefers x
L
to x
CD
, his optimal choice is x
L
. Thus,
this simple mechanism voluntarily implements the stated allocation rule, which is not Nash
implementable.
Both examples 1 and 2 show that there are voluntarily implementable social choice cor-
respondences that are not Nash implementable. The next example shows the converse.
Example 3 (Nash Implementable but not Voluntarily Implementable)
Let A = fw; x; yg, where w is the status quo. Let I = f1; 2g. Let S = fs; s
0
g. Preferences
are described by:
s s
0
1 2 1 2
x x w y
y y y x
w w x w
F (s) = fxg
F (s
0
) = fyg
This social choice function is monotonic and implementable by the simple mechanism
where player 2 chooses between x and y. However, this is not individually rational in state
11
s0
, and hence not voluntarily implementable. In particular, individual rationality requires
F (s
0
) = fwg.
Next we show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is an important social choice
correspondence that falls into the category of being Nash implementable, but failing to be
voluntarily implementable.
Example 4 (Non-Implementability of the Constrained Walrasian Correspondence)
Consider a two-person two-good exchange economy, with initial endowment point w.
There are two states, which determine two possible preference proles, as illustrated in gure 2
below.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Here, the unique Walrasian outcome at s is not a Walrasian equilibrium at s
0
. However,
the only changes in preferences relative to a occur at points that are not individually rational
for agent 2. Since such points will always be vetoed and lead to w, there are no preference
reversals between s and s
0
that can be used to satisfy IR-monotonicity. Thus, any mechanism
that yields a as an IR equilibrium outcome at s must also produce a as an IR equilibrium
outcome at s
0
, even though it is not a Walrasian outcome at s
0
. Since these are interior
points, this applies to the constrained Walrasian correspondence.
8
The next example shows that the implications of voluntary implementation extend far
beyond the consideration of Nash implementation. There are also implications for other forms
of implementation.
Example 5 (Not Voluntarily Implementable via any Solution, but Implementable via Many)
8
See Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) for a detailed discussion of the constrained Walrasian corre-
spondence and its Nash implementability.
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This is an example of an allocation rule that is individually rational, and is imple-
mentable in subgame perfect equilibrium, undominated Nash equilibrium, iterative elimi-
nation of weakly dominated strategies, and is virtually implementable. However, it is not
implementable by any solution concept if agents can veto outcomes that are not individually
rational. As in example 2, denote the initial endowment point by w. There are two states,
and the utility functions in state s are called U
S
1
and U
S
2
, respectively. In state s
0
, U
S
0
1
is
identical to U
S
1
for all allocations x for which U
S
1
(x
1
)  U
S
1
(w
1
) and U
S
0
2
is identical to U
S
2
for all allocations x for which U
S
2
(x
2
)  U
S
2
(w
2
). That is, preferences dier only on alloca-
tions outside the set of individually rational allocations. Let f(s) = x and f(s
0
) = x
0
be an
individually rational allocation rule, shown in gure 3.
FIGURE 3 HERE
Let U
S
1
and U
S
0
1
dier outside of the individually rational lens, as shown in that same
gure. This social choice function violates IR-monotonicity, since the utility functions only
dier on allocations that will revert to w in any mechanism that species them in the outcome
function.
In constrast, it is easy to show that these allocation rules are implementable via sub-
game perfect equilibrium, undominated Nash equilibrium, iterated weak dominance, perfect
equilibrium, and is also virtually implementable. For example, the following mechanism
implements f via iterated weak dominance, where y and z are the allocations marked in
gure 2:
m
21
m
22
m
11
x y
m
12
x z
m
13
x
0
x
0
In state s, m
11
weakly dominates m
12
. At the next iteration, m
22
is weakly dominated
by m
21
. At the third and last iteration m
11
strictly dominates m
13
so the solution in state s
13
is m
11
. In state s
0
, m
1
weakly dominates m
11
. At the next iteration, m
22
weakly dominates
m
23
. At the third and last iteration m
13
strictly dominates m
12
so the solution in state s
0
is
m
13
. Similar mechanisms can be constructed for implementation by other renements.
The insight from this example is that the voluntary constraint implies that individuals'
preference relations over outcomes that are not individually rational (for some individual)
are irrelevant. Renements have been used in implementation theory to take advantage of
any reversal in preferences, even when these involve alternatives that are sub-optimal or not
individually rational. This is not possible in voluntary implementation, regardless of the
solution concept used.
3.2 Implementation with Renegotiation
Maskin and Moore [1998] consider a dierent version of a reversion function, which also ts
nicely within the present framework. They are concerned with the renegotiation problem that
can arise in mechanism design. In particular, they argue that if g(m) is inecient in state s,
then the players will renegotiate the outcome to something that is Pareto ecient, and which
Pareto dominates it. Since the second property (Pareto domination of g(m)) will generally
depend on g(m) itself, they dene a reversion function that depends not only on the state but
also on the the allocation that is vetoed. In particular, they dene a renegotiation function
r : A  S ! A. Given that r is Pareto ecient, there will always be some voter who would
veto g(m) if it were inecient at stage s. Therefore, implementation with renegotiation is
consistent with our \veto" interpretation of the h function, and is an example of a G function.
3.3 Implementation with Coalitional Veto Sets
The notion of h-implementation can be generalized substantially, within the framework of the
G-function. First, as with implementation with renegotiation, one can allow h to depend on
the outcome that is being vetoed.
9
Second, and perhaps more interesting, one can allow for
9
Implicitly, the G function can also incorporate information about who is vetoing, as G depends on the
state. This then allows for outcomes such as veto by one agent and trade amongst the remaining agents.
14
coalitional veto sets. For example, one can require majority rule approval of the outcome of
the mechanism, with the outcome reverting to h(s) if g(m) is does not receive a majority. The
generalization of this is the concept of blocking coalitions. In our denition of \voluntary"
implementation, each individual constitutes a blocking coalition. In many contexts, one can
argue that this is too strong a requirement, and that larger coalitions may be needed to veto
an outcome.
Let C : S ) 2
I
be a blocking coalition correspondence, which species the set of all
blocking coalitions in each state. Thus, for example, under voluntary implementation, C(s) =
2
I
,; for all s, so that any set of objecting individuals can prevent an outcome. This denes
the mapping, H
C
: A S F , by
H
C
(a; s; h) = a if, for all c 2 C(s); aR
i
(s)h(s) for some i 2 c
= h(s) otherwise
This ts the form of a G-function and so the results on G-implementation apply.
While the examples and applications described above show the broad coverage of general
reversion function techniques for analyzing implementation, much of the details of imple-
mentability depend on the specication of the reversion function. Rather than simply take
that function as being exogenous, we turn next to analyze a class of situations where the
reversion function is naturally endogenously determined.
4 Voluntary Implementation with Repeated Mechanisms
In this section, we endogenize the generalized reversion function, by considering situations
where a player opting out of an outcome simply forces the mechanism to be replayed. The
motivation for examining this situation is simple, and related to the motivation for studying
implementation with renegotiation. If an individual vetoes g(m), it is unnatural to suppose
that the world stops at that moment. For example, in a pure exchange environment, if an
agent vetoes g(m), and the endowment results, the individuals in the economy could simply
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play the mechanism again.
10
This captures applications where we think of the mechanism as
describing the methods or framework available to agents for communication and negotiation,
where the replay of the mechanism is the natural form of (re)-negotiation.
This is how game theorists have modeled bargaining. When two agents bargain, say by
oers and counteroers, rejection of an oer generally does not mean no-trade (except in very
special cases like the ultimatum game). The reason for this is that the notion of voluntary
trade implies that if there are still gains to trade to be exploited, the agents involved will
continue playing some game. In this section, we explore a general model of recontracting of
this sort, when rejection (i.e., veto) of g(m) is followed by simply replaying the mechanism
again in the following period. This converts the original mechanism into an innite game
form.
For this reason, we time date outcomes, so the outcome space is expanded to be A =
Af1; 2; 3 : : :g and a typical outcome is denoted a
t
. For simplicity we write drop the subscript
in the rst period and write a
1
= a. In the event that players use strategies such that no
outcome is ever reached, the outcome of the game is denoted ;. We assume that y
t
P
i
(s); for
all i; y; s; and t.
11
4.1 Stationary Preferences, Equilibrium, and Implementation
Preferences are extended to be complete and transitive on A  f1; 2; 3 : : :g for all players.
The following assumptions on extended preferences over time dated outcomes, capture a
stationarity of preferences.
1. a
t
R
i
(s)b
t
, a
e
t
R
i
(s)b
e
t
for all a; b 2 A and t;
e
t 2 f1; 2; 3 : : :g (Ordinal stationarity).
2. a
t
R
i
(s)b
t+1
, a
e
t
R
i
(s)b
e
t
+1
for all a; b 2 A and t;
e
t 2 f1; 2; 3 : : :g (Intertemporal station-
arity)
10
More generally, a veto might trigger an alternative mechanism which is played. We looked at voluntary
implementation using sequential mechanisms in a matching/bargaining framework in Jackson-Palfrey (1998).
11
This is a simplifying assumption. It only needs to be true that implemented outcomes are weakly preferred
to no outcome, and that there is some outcome at some date that is strictly preferred by all agents to no
outcome. See Lemma 1 in the appendix and its proof for details.
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3. a
t
R
i
(s)a
t+1
, for all i, a, s, and t = 1; 2; : : :. (Weak Impatience).
The above assumptions are maintained throughout this section.
The rst two restrictions on preferences guarantee that individuals' tastes do not change
over time, and are thus time consistent. The third restriction avoids the pathological case
where individuals always prefer to defer agreement to the future.
A message prole m is a stationary equilibrium of (M; g) at s if, for all i, and
b
m
i
2 M
i
,
g(m) R
i
(s) H(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s; g(m)
2
).
12
So, a message prole is a stationary equilibrium if each player is best responding knowing
that a veto today results in the same message prole being played tomorrow. Essentially,
stationary equilibria correspond to the Markov perfect equilibria of the game form where in
a given period the mechanism is played, then agents are called on to veto sequentially, and
the process terminates with g(m) if there is no veto and starts over in the next period if
there is a veto. To be precise, in the appendix we show that the set of stationary equilibria
correspond exactly to the set of Markov perfect equilibria of the game form described above,
where agents do not veto when indierent.
While the stationary equilibria have a foundation as Markov perfect equilibria and may
be argued for on the grounds of simplicity, restricting attention to such equilibria rules out
some behavior that may be quite natural. Most importantly, such strategies ignore history
and eliminate many folk-theorem like constructions.
13
A social choice function is attainable in stationary equilibrium via a mechanism (M; g)
if, for each s, there exists a stationary equilibrium m
s
such that g(m
s
) = f(s).
Attainability is a very weak form of implementation (essentially, an indirect version of
truthful implementation). A social choice correspondence F is implementable in station-
ary equilibrium if there exists a mechanism, (M; g) such that, for all s :
12
Note that here the last argument of H is an outcome rather than a social choice function. This obvious
extension can be made formal by considering the constant social choice function resulting in g(m)
2
.
13
See Baron and Ferejohn (1989) for examples of such constructions and the role of stationarity in multi-
lateral bargaining.
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(i) For each a 2 F (s) there exists a stationary equilibrium, m 2M; such that g(m) = a
(ii) If m 2M is a stationary equilibrium at s, then g(m) 2 F (s).
Before taking a careful look at stationary implementation, we rst apply Theorems 1
and 2 to characterize stationary implementation. Given individuals' weak preference against
delay, the denition of G-monotonicity translates to:
A social choice correspondence F satises stationary monotonicity if, for all s, s
0
, and
for all x such that x 2 F (s) but x =2 F (s
0
), there exists y 2 A and i 2 I such that for all t,
x
t
R
i
(s) H(y
t
; s; x
t+1
) and H(y
t
; s
0
; x
t+1
) P
i
(s
0
) x
t
.
Theorem 3 If a social choice correspondence is implementable in stationary equilibrium then
it satises stationary monotonicity.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 1.
Within this abstract framework, we can also obtain a standard characterization of suf-
ciency for the case of 3 or more agents. If a social choice function satises stationary
monotonicity and an appropriately modied version of NVP, then it is implementable in
stationary Nash equilibrium. The modication of NV P to the dynamic case is stated below.
A social choice correspondence F satises stationary No Veto Power if for any i,
z 2 A, and s 2 S
[z
t
R
j
(s)H(y; s; z
t+1
) 8y 2 A; t; j 6= i]) [z 2 F (s)]:
Theorem 4 If n > 2 and a social choice correspondence satises stationary monotonicity
and stationary NVP, then it is implementable in stationary equilibrium.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 2.
Let us now analyze environments with more structure, where we can get a more detailed
picture of stationary implementation.
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4.2 Stationary Implementation with No Discounting
First, we consider the case with no discounting. That is the case where a
t
I
i
(s) a, for all i, a,
s, and t = 1; 2; : : :. Therefore, the time subscripts in the denition of stationary equilibrium
can be removed, and the problem becomes very straightforward.
In this case, we call f self-attainable if it is attainable in stationary equilibrium.
Self-attainability simply considers which social choice functions can be supported as sta-
tionary equilibria of a mechanism, completely ignoring the multiple equilibrium problem usu-
ally at the heart of implementation theory. The next proposition shows a simple sucient
condition for self-attainability.
Let PE denote the Pareto correspondence
PE(s) = fx j8y; yP
i
(s)x) 9j s:t: xP
j
(s)yg:
We say that a social choice function f is Pareto ecient if f(s) 2 PE(s) for every s.
Proposition 1 If f is Pareto ecient, then f is self-attainable.
Proof: Consider the mechanism in which each player simultaneously announces an outcome,
so M
i
= A. If all announcements match, say m
i
= x for all i, then let g(m) = x. If the
announcements don't all match, then let g(m) = x
0
, where x
0
is some pre-specied default
outcome. Consider s, and x = f(s). Note that x is Pareto ecient at s. We need only
show that m
i
= x for all i and t forms a stationary equilibrium at s. Suppose to the
contrary that there exists i such that H(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s; g(m)
2
)P
i
(s) g(m). This implies that
H(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s; g(m)
2
) = g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
). However, by the Pareto eciency of g(m), it follows
that since g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
)P
i
(s) g(m), there must exist j such that g(m)P
j
(s)g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
). This
contradicts the fact that H(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s; g(m)
2
) = g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
).
While any Pareto ecient selection is self-attainable, it is clear that the mechanism out-
lined in the above proof has a multitude of equilibria, some of which can be inecient. So we
should be interested in understanding which social choice correspondences are implementable
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in this setting. So, we turn to the stronger notion of implementation in stationary equilibrium,
which we call self-implementation in the no discounting case.
Let R
F
denote the range of F .
Proposition 2 If F is self-implementable, then R
F
\ PE(s)  F (s).
Proof: Consider s and a 2 R
F
\ PE(s), and a mechanism (M; g) that self-implements F .
Since a 2 R
F
it follows that there exists m such that g(m) = a. Since a is Pareto ecient,
thenm is a self-equilibrium at s by an argument similar to that in the proof of Proposition 1.
In special cases, we can say more. For example, if agents all have strict preferences over
the Pareto set in any state, then the Pareto Correspondence is self implementable. Consider
a mechanism such that for every prole of actions of the other agents, each agent has an
action which can lead to any outcome. (Such a mechanism exists, as evidenced by a modulo
construction.) It is easily seen that any such mechanism fully self-implements the Pareto
correspondence.
Another implication of Proposition 2 is that the (constrained) Walrasian correspondence
is not self-implementable, without discounting. This can be seen by revisiting Example 4,
where a is in the range of the (constrained) Walrasian correspondence and a is Pareto ecient
at s
0
, but a is not a (constrained) Walrasian equilibrium at s
0
.
14
Further implications of Proposition 2 depend on the structure of R
F
. To see this, consider
two extremes. At one extreme R
F
= fyg, so F is constant and F (s) = fyg for every s. This is
obviously self-implementable by any trival mechanism that has g(m) = y for all m. Thus one
can self-implement very selective F 's that may not be Pareto ecient. At the other extreme
suppose that R
PE
 R
F
. Thus, the range of F is quite large and includes all allocations that
may be Pareto ecient at some s. In this case, Proposition 2 implies that PE(s)  F (s).
This means that of the range of F is suciently rich, then F cannot be selective among
Pareto ecient allocations but must include them all.
14
Note that while the partial linearity of the indierence curve through a and w was necessary for Example 4,
it is not necessary for this point, and one can easily nd similar examples with strictly convex preferences.
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Thus Proposition 2 shows that the apparent permissiveness of proposition 1 is deceiving.
On the one hand it is true that any Pareto ecient allocation rule self-attainable. On the
other hand, once one constructs a mechanism to attain that allocation rule, then any other
allocation rule that is ecient relative to the range of the mechanism is also a stationary
equilibrium outcome of the mechanism. Finer selections from the Pareto ecient set of
allocation rules (relative to the range of the mechanism) are not self-implementable. So,
eectively one can only be selective at a given s by making sure that the range of F is narrow
across all s.
Note that these propositions are reminiscent of ndings in bargaining theory (e.g., Ru-
binstein (1982)). For example, if individuals do not discount the future, then any bargaining
split is an equilibrium outcome of the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game. What we have
shown above is that this feature is robust across settings and mechanisms. We also know
from the bargaining literature, that the introducing a strict preference against delay changes
the scope of equilibrium. That turns out to be true in the dynamic implementation problem
as well, as we now explore.
4.3 Stationary Implementation with Discounting
In most settings, it is more reasonable to expect that rejection of the outcome of a mechanism
will lead to delay in the implementation of a nal outcome, and that individuals nd this
delay costly.
The discounting case is formalized by requiring that aP
i
(s)a
t
, for all i, a, s, and t > 1.
For the discussion of the discounting case we assume that A is a metric space, with metric
j  j.
To begin to understand stationary implementation with discounting, we study a useful
strengthening of stationary monotonicity. This strong form of monotonicity is applicable in
many settings, including exchange economies.
A social choice correspondence F satises local monotonicity if, for all s, s
0
, and x 2
F (s) such that x =2 F (s
0
), and for all ", there exists y 2 A and i 2 I with jy , f(s)j < " such
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that x R
i
(s) y and y P
i
(s
0
) x.
Local monotonicity is a strengthening of monotonicity in that it requires that the test
alternative y can be picked to be arbitrarily close to x. If preferences are continuous then y
can be chosen so that it is preferred to receiving f(s) with one-period delay. This leads to
the following theorem that shows that in some reasonable cases, local monotonicity implies
stationary monotonicity.
Theorem 5 If preferences are continuous and individuals discount the future, then F satis-
es local monotonicity only if it satises stationary monotonicity.
Proof: Consider s, s
0
and x 2 F (s) such that x =2 F (s
0
). By the continuity of preferences
and discounting, there exists " such that zP
j
(s
0
)x
2
for all j and z such that jz , xj < ".
Apply local monotonicity with this ", to nd i and y with the properties stated in the
denition of local monotonicity. By our choice of " it follows that x
t
R
i
(s)H(y
t
; s; x
t+1
) and
H(y
t
; s
0
; x
t+1
) = y
t
P
i
(s
0
)x
t+1
. Thus, stationary monotonicity is satised.
We now illustrate the power of Theorem 5, by applying it to pure exchange environ-
ments to show that the constrained Walrasian social choice function can be implemented in
stationary equilibria.
Let ` denote the number of goods and e
i
2 IR
`
+
denote the endowment of agent i, where
P
i
e
i
2 IR
`
++
. Here, A = fx 2 IR
n`
+
j
P
i
x
i

P
i
e
i
g. For each i, the preferences of i depend
only on i's allocation (so xI
i
(s)y whenever x
i
= y
i
), are continuous, increasing (where x
i
 y
i
implies xP
i
(s)y), and convex.
An allocation x 2 A is a constrained Walrasian equilibrium at s if there exists p 2 IR
`
+
such that
 p  x
i
 p  e
i
 xR
i
(s)y for all y 2 A such that p  y
i
 p  e
i
.
The constraint in the denition above appears in the restriction to y 2 A which implies
that i's demand of any good is limited by the total available endowment in the economy.
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Theorem 6 With time discounting preferences, if n  3, then the constrained Walrasian
correspondence is implementable in stationary equilibrium.
Proof: We need only show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence satises local
monotonicity. Theorem 6 then follows from Theorems 5 and 4.
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Consider x that is a
constrained Walrasian equilibrium at s, with corresponding price p, but not at s
0
. It follows
that x is not the (constrained) demand of some agent i at s
0
. Given that preferences are
continuous, convex, and increasing, it follows that for any ", there exists y 2 A such that
p  y
i
 p  x
i
and jy , xj < " and y
i
P
i
(s
0
)x
i
. Local monotonicity is thus satised.
It is essential to Theorem 6 that the set of alternatives not be discrete. The ability to
nd trade-os locally is critical to the theorem. This is analagous to results in the theory
of bargaining, as for instance in the game analyzed by Rubinstein (1982) if only discrete
oers can be made, then if agents do not discount too much, then all splits are sustainable
in stationary equilibrium. Here, similar results hold: the results of the no-discounting case
carry over if the set of alternatives is discrete and players are suciently patient.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed an approach to implementation with generalized reversion functions, that
unies and extends some analyses of agents' abilities to opt out of a mechanism, renegotiate,
or otherwise alter the suggested outcome of a mechanism. We have also showed how this
(static) implementation approach can be usefully applied to dynamic settings to understand
implementation via stationary equilibria, where agents may veto a tentative outcome of a
mechanism and opt instead to play the mechanism over again.
There is a rich array of applications where dynamics are a crucial element, ranging from
the operation of continuous trading institutions to the rules governing electoral and legislative
institutions. While the analysis here (see also Kalai and Ledyard (1998)) gives us some initial
15
It is straightforward to check that stationary NVP is satised in an exchange economy with continuous
and locally non-satiated preferences and time discounting.
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insights into implementation in dynamic settings, it leaves open many interesting questions
associated with the problems of dynamic implementation.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2 The message spaces are dened by:
M
i
= S A f0; 1; 2; : : :g
The outcome function is dened by partitioning the set of message proles into two regions
corresponding to compatible (D
1
) and incompatible (D
2
) messages.
D
1
= fm 2M j9i 2 I; s 2 S; z 2 A such that m
j
= (s; z; 0) for all j 6= i;
and G(z; s) 2 F (s)g
D
2
= fm 2M jm =2 D
1
g
In D
1
, there can be at most one deviator. If there is no deviator, then g(m) = z. If i is
the single deviator, denote m
i
= (s
0
; y; k) and dene the outcome function as:
g(m) = z if G(y; s)P
i
(s)G(z; s) and m 2 D
1
= y if G(z; s)R
i
(s)G(y; s) and m 2 D
1
In D
2
, the outcome is determined by the largest integer game:
g(m) = m
2
i

where i

= minfijm
3
i
 m
j
j
for all j 2 Ig: The proof now involves showing three things:
1. If a 2 F (s) then there is a Nash equilibrium at s in which m
i
= (s; a; 0) for all
i. To see this, rst observe that since a 2 F (s), it must be that a = G(a; s); so m 2 D
1
,
g(m) = a; and G(g(m); s) = a: Furthermore, since s is being reported truthfully, any
unilateral deviation by some player i to
b
m
i
= (s
0
; y; k) can only change the outcome if
G(y; s) 6= a and aR
i
(s)G(y; s). In this case, i is no better o than he would have been
reporting (s; a; 0). Thus, it is an equilibrium for everyone to report (s; a; 0).
2. If G(a; s) =2 F (s
0
) then m
i
= (s
0
; a; 0) for all i is not a Nash equilibrium at s
0
.
This follows from h-monotonicity, which guarantees the existence of a feasible outcome,
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y, and an individual, i, such that aR
i
(s)G(y; s) and G(y; s
0
; h)P
i
(s
0
)G(a; s
0
; h). By doing
making a unilateral deviation to (s
0
; y; k), i can change the outcome from G(a; s
0
; h) to
G(y; s
0
; h), which makes i strictly better o.
3. If m

is an equilibrium at s and it is not the case that m
i
= (s; z; 0) for all i and
G(z; s) 2 F (s) then G(g(m

); s) 2 F (s). Since it is not the case that m
i
= (s; z; 0)
for all i and G(z; s) 2 F (s), then at least n , 1 of the agents can unilaterally cause
the outcome function to choose any outcome in A. Thus, for m

to be an equilibrium
requires that G(g(m

); s)R
j
(s)G(y; s) for all y 2 A, which, by h ,NVP , implies that
G(g(m

); s) 2 F (s).
Relationship of Stationary Equilibrium to Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Given a mechanism [M; g] dene the dynamic (stochastic) version of the mechanism,
[M; g]
1
, as follows. We append n veto moves (one for each player) to [M; g], producing an
n+1 stage game form. This is then played and terminates if no player vetoes and is repeated
otherwise. That is, in stage 1, each player i independently submits a message m
1
i
2 M
i
:
After this is done m
1
is revealed to all players. Next, player 1 chooses v
1
1
2 f0; 1g. The other
players observe v
1
1
and then player 2 chooses v
1
2
2 f0; 1g. The other players observe this and
then player 3 chooses v
1
3
2 f0; 1g. This process continues until all players have made a veto
choice v
1
i
. If v
1
i
= 0 for all i then the game form ends and the outcome is g(m)
1
. Otherwise,
play proceeds to period 2 and the process starts over: players again report messages followed
by a sequence of veto moves. If in the second stage v
2
i
= 0 for all i then the game form
ends and the outcome is g(m)
2
. If not, then play proceeds to period 3, and so on. Thus, the
interpretation is that v
t
i
= 1 constitutes a veto by i of g(m
t
).
Fixing any given preference prole, R, [M; g]
1
and R dene a stochastic game, and
so standard denitions of pure strategies and subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
apply.
16
For this game, a pure Markov strategy for i is a choice ofm
i
, and v
i
: Mf0; 1g
i 1
!
16
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for denitions. The stochastic nature of the game here is a very simple
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f0; 1g that is to played in every period (such that the game has not already ended).
17
Thus,
v
i
(m; v
1
; : : : ; v
i 1
) is a function of the message prole and the veto decisions of the previous
players in the current period. This can be further simplied, as the only time a player's veto
makes a dierence is in the case where the previous veto choices where all 0. Thus, without
loss of generality for the denition of Markov strategy in this game, one can take v
i
to depend
only on m. The corresponding strategy in the innite game is found by simply having i play
m
i
and v
i
whenever called on to do so. A pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium fR,
[M; g]
1
g is a prole of pure Markov strategies which form a pure strategy subgame perfect
equilibrium of fR, [M; g]
1
g.
Lemma 1 If m is a stationary equilibrium of [M; g] at s, then m together with v, dened
by v
i
(m) = 1 if and only if g(m)
t+1
P
i
(s)g(m)
t
for each i, form a Markov perfect equilibrium
of fR(s); [M; g]
1
g. Conversely, if (m; v) is a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of
fR(s); [M; g]
1
g and v is such that v
i
(m) = 0 if g(m)
t
I
i
(s)g(m)
t+1
, then m is a stationary
equilibrium of [M; g] at s.
Note that if v
i
(m) = 0 if g(m)
t
I
i
(s)g(m)
t+1
, then it must be that v
i
(m) = 0 if and only if
g(m)
t
R
i
(s)g(m)
t+1
. So the converse requires that players not veto when they are indierent.
To see why this is necessary consider the following simple example. M
1
= fm
1
; m
1
g
and M
2
= fm
2
g. Let g(m
1
; m
2
) = a and g(m
1
; m
2
) = b. Preferences are such that
a
t
P
1
(s)b
t
P
1
(s)b
t+1
P
1
(s); and a
t
I
2
(s)b
t
I
2
(s)b
t+1
P
2
(s);. So player 2 is completely indierent
while player 1 prefers a to b. The only stationary equilibrium is m
1
; m
2
. The combination
m
1
; m
2
is not a stationary as 1 has an improving deviation tom
1
; m
2
which will not be vetoed
since 1 prefers a
t
to b
t+1
and 2 is indierent. However, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium
with m
1
; m
2
where player 2 always vetoes m
1
; m
2
, since player 2 is fully indierent.
one with two states fended, continueg, which keep track of whether there has been a period with no vetoes and
so the game has ended, or whether in each previous period someone has vetoed and the game is continuing.
We consider only pure strategies and only pure strategy deviations.
17
Again, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for discussion of Markov strategies, Markov perfect equilibrium,
and references.
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Proof: Let us rst show that if m is a stationary equilibrium of [M; g] at s, then m
together with v, dened by v
i
(m) = 1 if and only if g(m)
t+1
P
i
(s)g(m)
t
for each i, form a
Markov perfect equilibrium of fR(s); [M; g]
1
g. First, it follows directly from the denition
of stationary equilibrium that if there is an improving deviation from the Markov strategies
m; v for some player i, then that deviation must involve a deviation in more than one period.
The nite one stage deviation principle (see, e.g., the proof of theorem 4.1 in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991)) then implies that if there is an improving deviation it must result in the
outcome 1. However, g(m) is (weakly) preferred to 1 and so m; v is a Markov perfect
equilibrium of fR(s); [M; g]
1
g.
Let us now show that ifm; v is a pure strategyMarkov perfect equilibrium of fR(s); [M; g]
1
g
and v is such that v
i
(m) = 0 if g(m)
t
I
i
(s)g(m)
t+1
, then m is a stationary equilibrium of [M; g]
at s. First note that if (m; v) is a pure strategy equilibrium of fR(s); [M; g]
1
g then v
i
(m) = 0
for each i and so the outcome is g(m) at time 1. (The only alternative outcome is ;, and
since all individuals prefer g(m) to ;, subgame perfection implies that each player condi-
tional on no previous vetoes must not veto g(m).) Also, subgame perfection and the fact
that v
j
(m) = 0 if g(m)
t
I
j
(s)g(m)
t+1
, implies that v
j
(m) = 0 if g(m)
t
R
j
(s)g(m)
t+1
. Sup-
pose that m is not a stationary equilibrium of [M; g] at s. Then there exists i such that
H(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s; g(m)
2
)P
i
(s)g(m). This implies that H(g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
); s; g(m)
2
) = g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
)
and so g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
)P
i
(s)g(m) and g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
)R
j
(s)g(m)
2
for all j. Since v
j
(m) = 0 if g(m)
t
R
j
(s)g(m)
t+1
for each j, we know that v
j
(
b
m
i
; m
 i
) = 0 for each j. But then g(
b
m
i
; m
 i
)P
i
(s)g(m) contra-
dicts the fact that m; v form a Markov perfect equilibrium.
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